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Abstract 
Global economic crisis in 2008 has increased the focus on the role of audit committee in 
ensuring integrity and transparency in corporate reporting. Audit committee characteristics 
are crucial in determining the ability of audit committee in carrying out its responsibilities 
effectively. Hence, this study aims to investigate the contribution of audit committee 
characteristics; independence, accounting expertise, multiple directorship, size, and 
diligence to audit committee effectiveness over corporate voluntary disclosure by Malaysian 
listed firms. The study uses 146 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for the year 2006. The 
empirical results have revealed that proportion of independent directors, and number of 
directors on audit committee is significantly associated with corporate voluntary disclosure, 
and hence enhances audit committee effectiveness. The study contributes to the 
understanding of the association between audit committee characteristics and such 
committee effectiveness in respect to voluntary disclosure practices.  
 
Keywords: Audit committee, Voluntary disclosure, Corporate reporting, Public listed 
companies  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A corporate disclosure has been in the limelight recently, following continual economic crisis 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Mohd Ghazali, 2010). Given its significant impact, 
corporate disclosure practice has received considerable attention from researchers, policy 
makers, and regulatory bodies (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011, Mohd Ghazali, 2010; 
Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Wan-Hussin, 2009; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Jiang et al., 2010; 
Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Allegrini & Greco, 2011). Corporate disclosure is crucially 
important for the growth and development of a firm in particular and equity market in general. 
Disclosures are considered to be an important mechanism in reducing information 
asymmetry between firm and outside investors (Jiang et al., 2010), and hence improve 
corporate reporting transparency. It is also viewed that transparency and adequate 
disclosure are also important in order to ensure the protection of minority shareholder’s 
rights. Investors would be able to make use of the information disclosed for decision making 
and for other investing activities (Chobpichien & Haron, 2007). Thus, the greater disclosure 
by company, the better the market efficiency is (Jiang et al., 2010).    
 
One of a major concern of corporate governance in emerging markets is corporate 
transparency (Filatotchev et al., 2011), whereby Asian companies are experiencing a lack of 
transparency and information disclosure (Globerman et al., 2011). In Malaysia, the 
inadequacy of high quality information results in inability of shareholders to assess the 
performance of concentrated shareholder listed firms (Rachagan, 2010). Accordingly, lack of 
corporate reporting transparency has resulted in a massive loss of investor’s confidence in 
the integrity of corporate reporting (Hashim & Devi, 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). 
Thus, there is an urgent need to improve the corporate governance system to enhance the 
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integrity of corporate disclosures which leads to increase investors’ confidence (Akhtaruddin 
et al., 2009). 
 
Audit committee is perceived as a key mechanism for improving corporate governance, and 
regarded as integral part of corporate reporting process  (HassabElnaby et al., 2007). The 
committee is a special operating committee of the board of directors, which is charged with 
oversight of financial reporting and disclosure. It is believed that individual audit committee 
characteristics influence the audit committee’s oversight performance over financial reporting 
process (Bedard & Gendor, 2010; Lin & Hwang, 2010). Prior research suggest that audit 
committee with independent and capable members monitor the internal management 
disclosure process, leading to fewer internal control problems, more conservatism 
accounting, less earnings management, fewer incidents of financial reporting fraud and 
higher quality of voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Garcia-
Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Owens-Jackson et al., 2009; 
Persons, 2009). Accordingly, audit committee characteristics are critical in supporting the 
audit committee’s ability to carry out its responsibilities effectively (Bedard & Gendor, 2010; 
Allegrini & Greco, 2011).  
 
Prior research has largely examined association between voluntary disclosure levels and 
corporate governance structure such as, board of directors’ characteristics, ownership 
structure and CEO duality (e.g Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Chau & Gray, 2010; Garcia-Meca & 
Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Jiang et al., 
2010; Mohd Ghazali 2010; Mohd Ghazali &  Weetman, 2006; Barako et al., 2006). However, 
it is claimed that there is a limited empirical research that examine the impact of audit 
committee characteristics on corporate disclosures (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Bedard & 
Gendron, 2010). Hence, this study is undertaken to address the gap in the existing literature 
and to extend the prior study of voluntary disclosure practices by investigating the influent of 
audit committee characteristics on such disclosure practice. Further, this study attempts to 
provide evidence that audit committee characteristics enhance audit committee 
effectiveness, and hence leading to better disclosure practices. This study attempts to 
contribute insights to the accounting literature by examining the effectiveness of audit 
committee structure in Malaysian firms and the outcome of this study would provide whether 
the existing structure of audit committee is effective in promoting corporate reporting. Thus, 
audit committee structure can be further improvised by regulators. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following section discusses the related 
literature and hypotheses development. This is followed by a section presenting research 
method. The results are presented and discussed in the subsequent section. Final section 
concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Audit committee and voluntary disclosure 
Demand for corporate voluntary disclosure has increased in the last few decades reflecting 
the dissatisfaction with mandatory disclosure from different parties who expect more 
comprehensive information from a firm about its activities (Chau & Gray, 2010). Outside 
investors mainly depend on corporate governance as a control mechanism that can 
influence corporate management to release additional financial information in their corporate 
reporting (Allegrini & Greco, 2011; Mohd Ghazali, 2010). Therefore, corporate voluntary 
disclosure practice is most important factor impacting investor’s investment decision 
(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).  
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Audit committee is considered as the most essential mechanism as it is charged with the 
oversight of financial reporting and disclosure (Bedard & Gendron, 2010). The primary 
function of audit committee is to assist directors in ensuring transparency of financial 
reporting and corporate accountability. The members of the audit  committee  are  delegated  
with  the responsibility to exercise their expertise and skill with the aim of diligently ensuring 
the accuracy, completeness, transparency  and timeliness  of  financial  statements  
prepared by  the  management. Audit committee members support auditor independence 
and auditor’s proposed adjustment (Lin & Hwang, 2010). Hence, it is natural to suggest that 
characteristics of an audit committee member influence the audit committees’ ability to 
execute its oversight role effectively (Beasley et al., 2009). Therefore, as audit committee 
effectiveness increases, corporate disclosure practices are expected to be improved. The 
audit committee characteristics investigated in this study are namely independence, 
accounting expertise, size, diligence and multiple directorships.  
 
2.2 Audit committee characteristics 
2.2.1 Audit committee independence 
Agency theory argues that the audit committee comprising of a majority of independent 
directors provide an effective monitoring role that improves the quality of information and 
enhances the disclosures quality (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Barako  et al., 2006; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). It is further argued that the inclusion of independent directors increases the 
audit committees’ ability to monitor and control the opportunistic behavior of corporate 
management (Wan Hussin, 2009). Independent directors on audit committee are appointed 
to reduce managerial consumption of perquisites, act as a positive influence over directors’ 
deliberations and decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), and to exercise 
independent judgment in situations where there are conflicts of interests between internal 
managers and shareholders such as reviewing financial reporting statements ( Beasley et 
al., 2009).   
 
Studies investigating the audit committee characteristics generally reveal that audit 
committee independence is a key factor for its effectiveness, as well as an essential element 
of achieving financial reporting quality (Bedard & Gendrom, 2010; Lin & Hwang, 2010). It has 
been evidenced that independent directors on audit committee improve earnings quality 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Mohd Saleh et al., 2007), and decrease the likelihood of financial 
reporting fraud (Owens-Jackson et al., 2009). Similar results indicate in Bronson et al., 
(2009) that the likelihood that firms receive a going concern opinion is influenced by the 
proportion of independent directors on audit committee. Concerning corporate disclosure, 
Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) have found firms with more outside directors on audit 
committee are more probably to release more additional information. Indeed, audit 
committee independent provides an effective monitoring means of overseeing financial 
reporting process. Therefore, it is predicted that independent directors on audit committee 
would lead to higher level of voluntary disclosures.    
 
2.2.2 Audit committee accounting expertise 
Audit committee members need to have sufficient understanding of accounting, finance, or 
financial literacy to act as effective monitors of the integrity of company’s financial reporting 
process and its disclosure practices (Emmerich et al., 2005). Further, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) 
have argued that having audit committee members who are lack of accounting knowledge 
and experiences actually threatens the firm’s overall financial reporting due to the inability to 
deal with issues affecting the firm’s financial reporting.  
 
Owens-Jackson et al., (2009) have claimed that probability of financial fraud is lower when 
audit committee has accounting expertise. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) have documented that 
accounting expertise of audit committee members mitigates the earnings management. 
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Accounting expertise sitting on audit committee could ensure a good system of internal 
control and consequently contribute to reliable and relevant financial reporting and high 
quality financial statements (Naiker & Sharma, 2009). These studies indicate the importance 
of audit committee accounting in performing effective monitoring roles. It is therefore, 
expected that audit committee members with accounting knowledge and experiences are 
more likely induce firm to provide more voluntary disclosure information.  
 
2.2.3 Multiple directorships of audit committee members 
Directors with additional directorships might contribute to their effective function as he or she 
might bring more experience and it has stronger incentives to monitor because of higher 
reputational capital stake (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Multiple directorships expose directors to 
different management styles, monitoring behavior, and different management practices, and 
therefore directors are more capable of monitoring the management’s financial reporting 
practices, which lead to enhance corporate disclosure practices and quality (Boo & Sharma, 
2008; Razman & Mohd Iskandar, 2004; Ismail et al., 2008). Moreover, multiple directorships 
is also found to have significant positive relationships with corporate social reporting 
practices (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Based on the above evidence, multiple directorships 
enhance the oversight role of audit committee over financial reporting process, and thus 
improve level of voluntary disclosure.  
 
2.2.4 Audit committee size 
A larger audit committee represents more divers skills, knowledge and talents to rely on in 
overseeing the financial reporting (Lin and Hwang, 2010). In addition, potential issues in 
corporate reporting disclosures are more likely to be uncovered and resolved with a higher 
number of audit committee members (Mohamad-Nor, et al., 2010). Allegrini and Greco 
(2011) and Persons (2009) have found that audit committee size has a positive impact on 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Based on the above, higher number of directors in audit 
committee may benefit the committee as these directors have expertise, experiences, and 
greater networking with the environment, and hence enhance level of voluntary disclosure.  
 
2.2.5 Audit committee diligence  
A more diligent audit committee, i.e., one that meets frequently during the year, would 
provide its members with greater opportunities for discussing and evaluating the issues that 
are placed before concerning the company’s financial reporting practices (Sharma et al., 
2009). Allegrini and Greco (2011) have argued that the frequency of audit committee 
meetings acts as a proxy of level of real monitoring and control. Therefore, higher levels of 
audit committee meetings indicate a more effective audit committee. Allegrini and Greco 
(2011) and Persons (2009) have found the audit committee diligent, measured by the 
frequency meeting of the audit committee, is positively associated with corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Prior research indicate that frequent meetings of audit committee would allow the 
members to express judgment and hence enhance their effectiveness in overseeing financial 
reporting process which in turn increases corporate voluntary disclosure practices. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The data were collected from 2006 annual reports of top 146 companies listed on the main 
market of Bursa Malaysia based on market capitalization after excluding finance and unit 
trust sectors because they have different regulatory requirements. The voluntary disclosure 
checklist in this study is adapted from both Akhtaruddin and Haron, (2010) and Mohd 
Ghazali (2010). Both checklists are based on an extensive review of prior studies that have 
been used in several prior studies (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; 
Chobpichien & Haron, 2007; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). The combined checklist was then 
extensively examined, and similar items detected were eliminated. This resulted in a 
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voluntary disclosure checklist comprising 86-items. Scoring was based on the presence of 
each item, firm is awarded 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 if it is not disclosed. The level of 
voluntary disclosure is determined by number of items disclosed divided by the maximum 
possible items applicable to that firm. The study utilized the ordinary lease squares (OLS) 
regression analysis to test the hypotheses. The following is the model of the study:  
 
VD = β0 + β1 ACIND + β2 ACACCTG + β3MDACMEM + β4 ACSIZ + β5 ACDILIG + β6 FSIZ + 
β7 LEVERG + β8 ROA + β9 BIG4 + ε         
                   (1) 
Where; 
 
VD   = Sum of all disclosure scores awarded divided by the maximum possible 
potential score 
ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCTG = Proportion of accounting expertise directors on audit committee 
MDACMEM = Proportion of multiple directorships of audit committee members  
(at least three outside directorships) 
ACSIZ = Total number of directors on the audit committee of the firm 
ACDILIG = The number of audit committee meetings for the year 
FSIZ = Natural log of total assets 
LEVERG = Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
ROA = Ratio of net income after tax divided by total assets 
BIG4 = Coded 1, if the firm is audited by big4; 0 otherwise 
β0 = The constant 
ε = Error term 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables examined in this study. The 
average percentage of voluntary disclosure for the sample is 54.41%, ranging from 40.7% to 
75.58%. The average disclosure index in this study is comparable to Akhtaruddin and Haron, 
(2010), but higher than reported by Mohd Ghazali (2010) who document an average 
voluntary disclosure of 40.94%.  About, 73% of audit committee members are independent. 
Around 31% of audit committee directors have accounting and auditing experience. On 
average, 33% of audit committee members have at least three outside directorships. In term 
of the number of audit committee members, the average size of audit committee is 3.79 
members. The average number of audit committee meeting held per year is about 4.9 
meetings, which is slightly higher than Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) who show that the average 
number of audit committee meetings in 2001 is 4.2 meetings. 
 
Table1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum SD 
VD 54.41 40.70 75.58 8.47 
ACIND 0.73 0.33 1.00 0.12 
ACACCTG 0.31 0.14 0.75 0.16 
MDACMEM 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.26 
ACSIZ 3.79 3 8 0.85 
ACDILIG 4.91 2.00 15.00 1.73 
FSIZ 14.31 11.25 18.45 1.25 
LEVERG 0.24 0.00 2.91 0.28 
ROA 0.082 -0.21 0.45 0.07 
BIG4 0.86 0.00 1.00 0.35 
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Table 2 reports the OLS regression results of level of voluntary disclosure on audit 
committee independence, accounting expertise, size, diligence and multiple directorships, 
controlling for firm size, leverage, return on assets and big 4 audit firm.  
 
Table2: OLS regression results  
Variable Coefficient t-test Sig 
(Constant) 0.156 1.77 0.078 
ACIND 0.152 1.969 0.050* 
ACACCTG 0.082 1.095 0.275 
MDACMEM 0.139 1.790 0.076 
ACSIZ 0.165 2.109 0.037* 
ACDILIG 0.140 1.867 0.064 
FSIZ 0.279 3.122 0.002* 
LEVERG 0.058 0.684 0.495 
ROA 0.292 3.683 0.000** 
BIG4 -0.094 -1.256 0.211 
R-squared  0.27 
Adj R-squared 0.22 
F-statistics 5.66 
Sig 0.000 
Note: ** significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
 
As reported in Table 2, coefficient of ACIND is significant and positive related to VD. This 
indicates that independent directors in audit committee effectively influence corporate 
manager to release more additional information. The insignificant association between audit 
committee accounting expertise and level of voluntary disclosure suggesting that accounting 
experience of audit committee members is not important in explaining the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Audit committee with multiple directorships is insignificantly associated with 
extent of voluntary disclosure. The result suggests that the directorships in other firms do not 
appear beneficial to audit committee in overseeing voluntary disclosure practices.   Audit 
committee size is found to have a positive and significant association with level of voluntary 
disclosure. The evidence indicates that larger audit committee efficiently monitors 
management’s financial disclosure practices and thus enhances voluntary disclosure 
practices. The results however show that audit committee diligent is insignificant. This 
implies that the diligence of audit committee measured by frequency meeting does not 
enhance monitoring role of such committee in improving voluntary disclosure practices. In 
respect to control variables, the study has found a positive significant association between 
larger firms, firms with higher ROA and level of voluntary disclosure. However, audit firm, 
and leverage have no significant impact on voluntary disclosure.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Best practices in audit committee is regarded a key indicator of good corporate governance. 
Audit committee has a significant role on overseeing corporate reporting process. Being one 
of the key players in corporate reporting process, an effective audit committee would bring 
corporate reporting disclosure to a higher level of transparency and integrity. This study 
examines the impact of audit committee characteristics of Bursa Malaysia listed firms on 
corporate voluntary disclosures. Consistent with expectations, audit committee 
independence and size are significantly associated with level of voluntary disclosure. Results 
show that independent directors on audit committee perform effectively as monitoring 
mechanism because they are decision experts, and able to exercise independent judgment 
in reviewing financial reporting statements and consequently more ability to monitor and 
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evaluate management’s disclosure practices which in turn reduces the asymmetric 
information and increases reporting transparency.  
 
Moreover, larger number of audit committee members provides such committee with pool of 
expertise, rank of perspectives, and diverse skills that lead to improve firms’ voluntary 
disclosure practices. However, the results have indicated that accounting expertise, multiple 
directorships of audit committee members, and audit committee diligence do not contribute 
to the extent of voluntary disclosure. This study provides an insight into the audit committee 
characteristics that are associated with such committee effectiveness in respect to voluntary 
disclosure practices of Malaysian listed firms. The empirical results provide support to the 
significant role of audit committee in improving corporate disclosure practices, and hence, 
enhance level of voluntary disclosure.  
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